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Abstract
Consider the classical ElGamal digital signature scheme based on the modular
relation αm ≡ yr rs [p]. In this work, we prove that if we can compute a natural
integer i such that αi mod p is smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to
sign any given document without knowing the secret key. Therefore we extend and
reinforce Bleichenbacher’s attack presented at Eurocrypt’96.
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1 Introduction
It was in 1976 that Diffie and Hellman published their famous paper ”New directions
in cryptography” [4]. For the first time in communication history, they provided
us with a mechanism that guarantees the confidentiality of documents and data we
like to exchange over a public and insecure channel. This event is at the origin of
the public key cryptography [4,14,13]. Since then, many original cryptographical
methods were conceived and proposed to solve a variety of communication prob-
lems like identification, authentication, integrity or 0-knowledge proof. However, the
most important field in public key cryptography is probably the digital signature
protocol. Its requirement in e-business for funds transferring, makes it a sensitive
question. Let us recall the principle. For the user Alice we prepare two kind of keys.
The first, y, is public and must be largely diffused to the other users. The second, x,
is private and must be kept secret. When Alice decides to sign a document M , she
has to solve a difficult problem, in general a mathematical equation. This problem
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is depending of Alice public key y and of the document M . It is constructed in a
way such that nobody, except Alice, can solve it. With the help of her secret key
x, Alice is able to give the answer.
The equation is based on a hard question in mathematics like factorization or dis-
crete logarithm problem. We cannot forge Alice signature, but anyone like a judge
can verify that the solution she gives is valid.
Let p be a prime number and α a primitive element modulo p. The discrete
logarithm problem consists of solving the modular equation αx ≡ β [p], where β is
a fixed integer and x is the unknown variable. In 1978, Pohlig and Hellman [12]
elaborated an efficient algorithm when p − 1 is B−smooth. In 1985, ElGamal [6]
proposed a public key cryptosystem and one of the first digital signature protocols
both based on the discrete logarithm. Nobody knows how he found his difficult
signature equation. Several variants of the signature scheme were developed [15, 5,
10 table 11.5 p.457,7,9]. In 1996, Bleichenbacher [2,3] built an attack that relies on
Pohlig and Hellman algorithm if ElGamal signature parameters are not properly
chosen. In 1999, Kuwakado and Tanaka [9] proved that, when we use ElGamal
method to sign two documents, if the secret nonces k1, k2 are less than the square
root of the prime modulus p, then we can compute the secret key of the signer and
break all the system. In 2011, the author slightly extended Bleichenbacher’s attack
[8].
Let αm ≡ yr rs [p] be the ElGamal classical signature equation. In this work, we
show that if we can compute a natural integer i such that αi mod p is B−smooth
and divides p − 1, then it is possible to sign any given document without knowing
the secret key. As a consequence, we prove that if (p, α, y) is Alice public key, and
if one the four positive integers α, p − α,
1
α
mod p or −
1
α
mod p is B-smooth
and divides p − 1, then it is possible to sign any message without knowing Alice
private key. Therefore we extend and reinforce Bleichenbacher’s attack presented
at Eurocrypt’96.
Note also, that our work tends to confirm, what was mentioned by many authors:
it is certainly easier to break ElGamal signature scheme than to solve the discrete
logarithm problem.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly recall the classical
ElGamal signature scheme. Section 3 is devoted to the review of Bleichenbacher’s
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attack [2,3]. Our contribution is presented in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
Throughout this article, we will adopt ElGamal paper notations [5]. Z, N are
respectively the sets of integers and non-negative integers. For every positive integer
n, we denote by Zn the finite ring of modular integers and by Z
∗
n the multiplicative
group of its invertible elements. Let a, b, c be three integers. The great common
divisor of a and b is denoted by gcd(a, b). Two numbers a and b are said to be
coprime if gcd(a, b) = 1. We write a ≡ b [c] if c divides the difference a − b, and
a = b mod c if a is the remainder in the division of b by c. The positive integer a
is said to be B-smooth [10, p.92], B ∈ N, if every prime factor of a is less than or
equal to the bound B. Generally, parameter B depends of the computer power.
2 Classical ElGamal signature
In this section we recall the basic ElGamal signature scheme [6, 16 p.287, 10 p.454,
11 p.183].
1. Alice chooses three numbers:
- p, a large prime integer.
- α, a primitive element (or a generator) [10, p.69] of the finite multiplica-
tive group Z∗p
- x, a random element belonging to the set {2, 3, ..., p − 2}.
Then she computes y = αx mod p. Alice public keys are (p, α, y), and x is her
private key.
2. To sign the message m, Alice needs to solve the equation :
αm ≡ yrrs [p] (1)
where r, s are the unknown variables.
Alice fixes arbitrary r to be r = αk mod p, where k is chosen randomly and invertible
modulo p− 1. Equation (1) is then equivalent to :
m ≡ xr + ks [p − 1] (2)
As Alice knows the secret key x, and as the integer k is invertible modulo p− 1, she
computes the second unknown variable s: s ≡
m− xr
k
[p− 1]
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3. Bob can verify the signature by checking that congruence (1) is valid for the
variables r and s given by Alice.
To avoid some attacks, instead of signing a message M , it is more secure to apply
a hash function h, like SHA1 [16 p.137, 10 p. 348], and compute m = h(M) before
signing the hashed value m.
3 Bleichenbacher’s attack
In this part we recall Bleichenbacher’s remarquable attack presented at the Euro-
crypt’96 conference [2]. Here, of course, we use the corrected version [3].
Let (p, g, yA) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature scheme, and xA his
private key.
Theorem 1. [3] let p − 1 = bw where b is smooth and let yA ≡ g
xA (mod p) be
the public key of user A. If r and k are known such that r ≡ αk ≡ cw (mod p) with
0 < c < b then it is possible to generate a valide ElGamal signature (r, s) for all h
with h ≡ xAr (mod gcd(k, p− 1)) can be found. In particular when r is a generator
of F∗p then it is possible to generate an ElGamal signature for all h.
Theorem 1 has an immediate practical consequence :
Corollary 1. ([3]) If α is B−smooth and divides p − 1 then it is possible to
generate a valid ElGamal signature on an arbitrary value h if p ≡ 1 [4] and on one
half of the values 0 ≤ h < p if p ≡ 3 [4].
when p ≡ 1 [p], we easily derive the following algorithm and we will exploit it in an
illustrative example of our own attack.
Algorithm 1.
1- Input (p, α, y); {α is B−smooth and divides p− 1, p ≡ 1 [4]}
2- Input m; {m = h(M) where M is the message to be signed.}
3- k ←− (p− 3)/2;
4- r ←− αk mod p; { r is is the first parameter of the digital signature. We also
have r := (p− 1)/α. }
5- w ←− (p − 1)/α;
6- b←− αw mod p; {b is a generator of a suitable subgroup H}.
7- B ←− yw mod p; {B is an other element of H}.
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8- x0 ←− x; { x is a solution to the easy discrete logarithm problem b
x ≡ B [p],
since the Pohlig and Hellman algorithm [12] is efficient. }
9- s←−
h(M) − rx0
k
[p− 1]; {s is the second parameter of the digital signature. }
10- Output (r, s). { The couple (r, s) is the ElGamal digital signature without using
Alice private key x.}
In 2011, Corollary 1 was extended by the author to the next more general result:
Theorem 2. [8] Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature protocol.
An adversary can forge Alice signature for any given message if one of the following
conditions is satisfied :
a) p ≡ 1 [4], α is B-smooth and divides p− 1.
b) p ≡ 1 [4],
1
α
mod p is B-smooth and divides p− 1.
c) α2 is B-smooth and divides p− 1.
4 Our contribution
We start this section by describing our main result which is a significant extension
of Bleichenbacher’s Corollary 1. Throughout this part, for more clarity and without
loss of generality, we always suppose that the prime modulus p in equivalent to 1
modulo 4. When p ≡ 3 [4] all our results still valid but only for documents M such
that the integer m = h(M) has a fixed parity.
Theorem 3. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature protocol.
Suppose that p ≡ 1 [4]. If we can compute a natural integer i, coprime to p − 1,
such that αi mod p is B−smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to generate
a digitale signature for any given document without knowing Alice private key.
Proof. Let M be the message that we would like to sign and m = h(M) be its
hashed value. We must find two unknown integers r and s such that αm ≡ yr rs [p].
Let i be a natural integer coprime to p − 1 such that αi mod p is B−smooth and
divides p− 1. ElGamal digital signature Equation (1) is equivalent to
αim ≡ yir ris [p] (3)
If we set β = αi mod p, z = yi mod p, u = r and v = is mod (p− 1), we obtain the
new modular equation
βm ≡ zu uv [p] (4)
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Since gcd(i, p− 1) = 1, the element βi mod p is a primitive root. As βx mod p = z,
where x is Alice secret key, the triplet (p, β, z) can be seen as the public key of an
imaginary user in an ElGamal signature protocol. We do not need the private key
x. For any given document M , by Corollary 2, it is possible to solve equation (4)
and to find the unknown variables u and v. Therefore, we generate a signature by
giving the couple r = u and s =
v
i
mod (p− 1).
Observe that a trapdoor could be hidden in the generator α by choosing it such
that αi mod p is B-smooth and divides p− 1, with a large exponent i.
To illustrate our technique, let us give a numerical example.
Example 1. Assume that p = 1597, α = 11 and y = 159. The secret key x = 856
is ignored.
Suppose that we want to sign the message M such that m = h(M) = 1234, where h
is a hash function like SHA1. Observe, first, that Bleichenbacher’s attack cannot be
mounted here. On another side, conditions a) and b) in Theorem 2 are not satisfied.
Let us therefore apply our method. With the help of a computer, we find that the
smallest positive exponent i such that β = αi mod p divides (p − 1) is i = 275.
As z = yi mod p = 1287, we determine the public key of a fictive user (p, β, z) =
(1597, 38, 1287). Obviously β is B−smooth. Algorithm 1 gives us the signature
(u, v) = (42, 1202). As u = r and v = is mod (p − 1), we obtain (r, s) = (42, 370).
So, we have signed the message M such that h(M) = 1234 without using Alice
private key x. Any verifier can check that the ElGamal modular equation (1) is
valid.
Assume that (p, α, y) is Alice public key. In somehow, our result in Theorem 3
means that, to break the ElGamal digital signature system, it is not needed to have
p− 1 a multiple of α as it is claimed by Bleichenbacher [2,3], but it suffices to have
p − 1 a multiple of anyone of the primitive elements modulo p. Next corollary is
another extension.
Corollary 2. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature protocol.
Suppose that p ≡ 1 [4]. If one among the four positive numbers α, p− α,
1
α
mod p
or
−1
α
mod p, is B−smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to generate a
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signature for any given document without knowing Alice private key.
Proof. For α and
1
α
mod p apply respectively Corollary 1 and Theorem 2. Let us
study the two cases corresponding to p−α and −
1
α
mod p. The even integer p− 1
can be decomposed as p−1 = 2k l, where k, l are the two easily computable natural
numbers such that k ≥ 2 and l is odd. Fermat little theorem gives the modular
relation αp−1 ≡ 1 [p]. As the order of the primitive element α is p − 1, looking at
the factorization of αp−1 − 1 modulo p, we necessary have α2
k−1l ≡ −1 [p] which
implies α2
k−1l+1 ≡ −α [p] and α2
k−1l−1 ≡ −
1
α
[p]. Since gcd(α2
k−1 l±1, p − 1) = 1,
the proof is achieved by immediate application of our theorem 3.
There is a well known particular situation for the generator choice: ”Choosing α = 2
is exceptionally bad” [2,3,1,10 p.456]. We extend the case:
Corollary 3. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature protocol.
Suppose that p ≡ 1 [4]. It is possible to forge Alice digital signature for any given
message M if we have one of the two conditions:
i) α = 2.
ii) Number 2 is a primitive element of the multiplicative group Z∗p and the positive
exponent i such that αi ≡ 2 [p] is computable.
Proof. Similar to the justification of Theorem 3.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we determined new primitive elements of the multiplicative finite
group Z∗p, p prime, for which ElGamal digital signature scheme is no more secure.
We therefore made an extension of the old and remarquable result presented by
Bleichenbacher at Eurocrypt’96.
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